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The Twin Effects of Globalization 





Employees of globalized firms face a riskier menu of labor market outcomes. They face a 
more uncertain stream of earnings and riskier employment prospects. However, they may also 
have stronger incentives to train and upgrade their skills and/or may benefit from more rapid 
careers. Hence, the costs of uncertainty and the benefits of skill upgrading associated with 
globalization may be twin to each other. We provide statistical evidence of this so far 
neglected trade-off for a sample of Indian manufacturing firms. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Critics of globalization argue that openness undermines labor market institutions by lowering 
job security and raising the volatility of real incomes. In this paper we argue that this is only a 
partial view of the effects of globalization on the labor market. In our sample of Indian 
manufacturing firms, we find that the employees of "globalized" firms face a riskier but also 
more rewarding menu of labor market outcomes. On the one hand, the employees of firms 
subject to foreign competition indeed face more volatility in their earning streams and 
employment prospects. At the same time, however, their ability to upgrade their skills is 
higher (they are more likely to be involved in training programs) and/or their career is faster 
(they are more likely to be promoted). This holds in a multivariate framework after 
controlling for the productivity differences that may induce the best performing firms to self-
select into becoming global. Thus we conclude that, with globalization, the costs of 
uncertainty are associated with the benefits of skill upgrading: isolating one side of the coin 
gives a misleading picture of globalization. 
The labor market effects of trade liberalization in developing countries have been 
extensively investigated in the literature. Among the beneficial effects, the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem suggests that wage inequality should fall when countries which are relatively 
abundant of unskilled labor open to trade. Most models of imperfect competition suggest that, 
as market size grows, workers should benefit from higher real wages and more employment 
opportunities. Moreover, there is evidence that trade integration raises growth via technology 
transfers, knowledge spillovers and scale economies.
1 
These implications are controversial, though. The presumption that globalization brings 
about a fall in wage inequality only holds as long as developing countries, before opening up 
their economies, do not levy high tariffs on labor-intensive industries. If this is the case, factor 
intensities may be reversed and globalization may thus widen, rather than narrow, wage 
inequality. Moreover, the causal link between exporting activity and productivity growth has 
also been questioned, and the alleged causal relationship among them has been object of 
extensive theoretical and empirical scrutiny. 
2, 
3 
                                                 
1 Bernard and Jensen (1997) find a significant positive relation between exports and productivity, the "learning-
by-exporting effect". 
2 Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) first pointed out that the positive correlation 
between exports and productivity, rather than reflecting the beneficial consequence of integration, is the result of 
the firms' self-selection: only the most productive firms become exporters.   3
On the other hand, the list of the risks typically associated with globalization is quite 
long. Rodrik (1997) and Stiglitz (2002) have emphasized the potential for domestic labor 
market disruption and the trade-off between static and dynamic gains from trade, when 
comparative advantage locks developing countries in low-growth sectors. Rodrik has also 
argued that globalization is likely to raise labor market volatility, since firms may more easily 
substitute foreign for domestic labor and consumers may more easily substitute foreign for 
domestic goods. As a result, the firms' demand for labor becomes more elastic, so that 
demand shocks have magnified effects on wages and employment. Yet whether international 
integration and uncertainty are empirically related is a matter which is hardly settled in 
empirical work Rodrik (1998) finds that exposure to international risk, measured by the 
interaction between trade openness and terms of trade volatility, is associated with growth 
volatility and the size of government. In contrast, Iversen and Cusak (2000) find no 
significant relationship between, on one hand, the volatility of output, employment and wages 
in OECD countries, and, on the other, trade;  Slaughter (2001) presents evidence for the US 
economy showing that the wage elasticity of labor demand has increased for production 
workers but not for non-production workers. 
Our paper adds to this literature by focusing on a less explored aspect of the openness-
volatility relationship. In a sample of Indian manufacturing firms in the late 1990s, we 
document that firms (and workers) exposed to globalization react to the uncertainty associated 
to foreign competition by investing more in training. We also find evidence that the 
employees of global firms on average have faster careers. More precisely, firms that are more 
exposed to international competition in our sample: 1) display a higher volatility of sales, 
profits,  employment and prices; 2) are more likely to train and promote their employees. This 
is particularly apparent for exporters compared to non-exporters. This finding also applies, 
albeit less robustly, to firms that face import competition in the domestic market and is robust 
to changes in the empirical specification. These results to our knowledge are novel in the 
literature. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the effects of uncertainty on labor 
market outcomes. Section 3 discusses the reasons why India in the late 1990s is an interesting 
case-study for the effects of globalization on firms. Section 4 describes the data set and 
compares the levels and volatility of wages, employment, prices, sales, profits, promotions 
                                                                                                                                                          
3 For comprehensive surveys of the effects of globalization on labor markets in developing countries see Hanson 
and Harrison (1999), Robertson (2000) and Epifani (2003). Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2002) surveyed the 
evidence on the relation between FDI, wages, working conditions and labor standards.   4
and training for firms with different degrees of exposure to international competition Section 
5 describes our econometric methodology and the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
II.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Globalization may raise volatility through different channels. For example, the impact of 
terms of trade shocks on real wages may be larger the higher the share of imported goods in 
the consumption basket. Productivity shocks may also be more frequent and larger for firms 
exposed to international competition, since they face a larger variety of close substitutes 
produced by foreign competitors. Globalization may also weaken long-term employment 
relationships (Newman and McLaren, 2002), add to price uncertainty and increase 
specialization, so that risks become more rather than less concentrated (Iversen and Cusak, 
2000). On the other hand, there are many ways in which firms and workers may react to a 
more volatile environment. Firms may try to develop new products and exploit the (possibly) 
more stable revenue stream that comes from the monopoly power in the new products. For 
example, Bernard et al. (2006) show that higher firm-level ability raises a firm’s productivity 
across all products, which induces a positive correlation between a firm intensive (output per 
product) and extensive (number of products) margins. Trade liberalization fosters productivity 
growth within and across firms and in aggregate by inducing firms to shed marginally 
productive products and forcing the lowest-productivity (low-skill labor intensive) firms to 
exit. 
Finally,  firms with limited access to the capital market may find it convenient to expand 
their size (as measured by employment) as a way to shield their income streams from the  
uncertainty, and, for similar reason  their employees may find it convenient to improve their 
skills,. In the Appendix we present a simple model that provides a few testable implications: 
ceteris paribus, firms facing higher uncertainty due to foreign competition should be larger, 
employ relatively more skilled workers,  train them relatively more intensively  and promote 
them relatively more frequently  
 
III.  WHY INDIA?  
 
We investigate the “twin effects” of globalization by focusing on India in the late 1990s. The 
trade liberalization reforms, initiated in the early 1990s, gradually exposed Indian 
manufacturing firms to novel opportunities.    5
Since independence, India has been characterized by active government intervention 
aimed at fostering domestic growth through import substitution. Over the years, the economy 
became riddled with a number of economic distortions: tariffs and import quotas, industry-
specific licensing requirements on investment projects beyond certain thresholds, restrictions 
on FDI flows (particularly those with little technological content).Export subsidies were 
usually paid against comparative advantage considerations, typically to firms not belonging to 
traditional labor intensive sectors. 
In June 1991, in the wake of a serious balance-of-payment crisis, a newly elected 
Government initiated a major program of economic reform and trade liberalization with the 
support of the IMF and the World Bank. The New Industrial Policy (NIP) slashed average 
tariffs from 80 per cent in 1990 to 37 per cent in 1996. The number of "strategic" sectors 
reserved to public enterprises was drastically reduced, and the scope for the cumbersome 
licensing system severely limited. Under the NIP, new legislation allowed for foreign 
majority participation in domestic shares, at least for "high priority" and export-oriented 
industries, and technology transfer agreements stopped being a prerequisite for FDI 
permissions. 
Overall, the wave of reforms of the 1990s was a success. Industrial production grew by 
seven percent per year in 1992-1997. Import growth boomed to 25 percent per year in 1993-
96, a big jump from the 15 percent rate of the previous five years, while exports grew in line 
with the previous period (also at a yearly rate of 25 percent). All in all, the degree of openness 
of the Indian economy - the GDP share of imports plus exports - roughly doubled, from 10 
percent in the early 1990s to about 20 percent in the mid 1990s. Over the same period the 
annual growth rate of private investment reached 16.5 percent, up by about two percentage 
points from the previous five years. GDP growth accelerated as well. 
The benefits didn't last long, however. The South-East Asian crisis of 1997-98 and the 
subsequent deceleration in the growth of world trade substantially slowed down the growth of 
the Indian economy. After the 1995-96 growth peak, the growth of industrial production, 
exports and imports fell considerably in the two subsequent years. In turn, the growth 
slowdown also triggered (and was probably aggravated by) a reform reversal: between 1997 
and 1999, new trade restrictions were put in place again in the form of non-tariff barriers and 
anti-dumping measures.
4 
                                                 
4 As many as 103 antidumping measures were still active in 2000, compared to 64 in 1999 and 49 in 1998. The 
International Monetary Fund (2001) reports that, throughout 1997-2000, there was little change in the average 
tariffs rates, while the maximum bound rate was reduced from 45 to 35%.   6
These developments arguably affected firms according to their effective exposure to 
foreign competition which makes India at the end of the Nineties an interesting case-study for 
the effects of globalization. Although we cannot properly evaluate the before-and-after of 
trade reform (we lack time series data for our labor outcome variables), we can compare the 
response - conditional and unconditional - of globalized firms (those exporting or facing 
external competition in the domestic market) to that of firms which were largely shielded 
from foreign competition. 
 
 
IV.  DATA SET AND DEFINITIONS 
 
Our data set draws on a survey conducted by the Confederation of Indian Industries and the 
World Bank on almost nine hundreds manufacturing firms from five industries, i.e. garments, 
textiles, drugs and pharmaceuticals, electronic consumer goods, and electrical white goods (a 
branch of electrical machinery). These firms are located in the cities of Ahmedabad (State of 
Gujarat), Bangalore (Karnataka), Calcutta (West Bengal), Chandigarh (Punjab), Chennai 
(Tamil Nadu), Cochin (Kerala), Delhi (Haryana), Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh), Kanpur 
(Uttar Pradesh), Mumbai and Pune (Maharashtra).
5 As shown in Table 1 and 2, the selected 
states and localities host a fairly sizable number of firms in at least three of the industries 
covered by the survey. 
Our multivariate analysis is conducted on a cross-section of firms in 1999, for 
information about some of our variables of interest (training and promotions) is only available 
for that year. Yet the World Bank data provide information on several firm characteristics for 
1997-1999, such as the ownership structure, the levels of investment and type of technology, 
the relations with suppliers and the government, the firm's location, the volume of trade, the 
number of products, their prices, the quantity and types of inputs, labor and human resources, 
assets and liabilities. We will exploit some of the 1997-99 data to compute our volatility 
indicators as indicated below. 
 
                                                 
5 As discussed in Dollar, Iarossi and Mengistae (2002), the selection of the states was based on three criteria. The 
first criterion was that states at all levels of development be represented in the sample. The states of Delhi, 
Maharashtra, Gujarat, Punjab and West Bengal represent the high-income group. Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, 
Kerala and Tamil Nadu are middle-income states. Uttar Pradesh is the only low-income state. The poorest Indian 
states (such as Orissa, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan) are thus under-represented in the sample. Second, 
the sample includes some states that have enacted pro-worker legislation and some others which have passed 
pro-business legislation (see Besley and Burgess 2003). Another paper employing this World Bank data set is 
Barba Navaretti, Galeotti and Tucci (2002).   7
Defining "globalization" 
 
The first step for assessing the labor market implications of globalization is to define 
what we mean by "globalization" for an individual firm. We use two criteria. In order to 
capture the firms’ degree of exposure to foreign competition in the product market, one would 
ideally estimate the elasticity of substitution between the firm's product and that of domestic 
and foreign competitors. In the absence of detailed information on domestic and foreign 
prices and quantities, we proceed as follows. A firm may face foreign competition either on 
the domestic (if import-competing) or on foreign (if exporting) markets, or both. In the first 
instance, we label Exporters (E) all the firms whose revenue share from exports be greater 
than or equal to 30 percent (and non-exporters the remaining ones). Since both exporting and 
non-exporting firms may also face foreign competition in the Indian domestic market, we 
further classify as firms subject to foreign competition (FC) those firms which declare in the 
survey that they face "foreign competitors in the domestic market”.
6 Based on this 
classification, we partition the 555 firms for which trade and foreign competition information 
is available into four categories: EFC, ENFC, NEFC and NENFC. The “EFC” firms (there are 
127 of them) are the exporters subject to foreign competition in the domestic market, the 
“ENFC” (82) are the exporters declaring not to face foreign competition when they sell in the 
domestic market, the 150 “NEFC” are the non-exporting firms subject to foreign competition 
and, finally the 196 “NENFC” are the non-exporting firms declaring that they do not face 
foreign competition the domestic market. Clearly, EFC and NENFC firms are respectively the 
most and the least “exposed-to-globalization” firms in our sample. 
Globalization also comes about through access to the international capital market. Thus 
we label as "Foreign Owned" (FO) firms where foreigners hold positive share of capital. This 
definition has the inconvenient that does not allow us to discriminate between multinational 
corporations and joint ventures. It turns out, however that only 4 percent of firms are FOs. 
As mentioned above, some of our variables of interest, namely training and promotions, 
and some of our control variables are only available for a subset of firms and for the year 
1999, which makes our actual sample size markedly smaller than its notional size and, at 
times, in an unbalanced way across specifications. These smaller samples may not be fully 
representative of the complete sample. We have checked that this is not the case by 
                                                 
6 It should be noted that, while the status of "exporter" is objective, the status of "firm subject to foreign 
competition" is to a large extent subjective, for it relies on the managers' assessment of the presence of foreign 
competitors.   8
comparing descriptive statistics for a number of variables for which data are available for the 
entire sample and its subset. These statistics turn out to be virtually identical. 
 
Sectors and locations 
 
Table 1 presents the distribution of our 555 manufacturing firms, classified by foreign 
exposure and sector. Table 2 provides information on the firm classification by location and 
sector. 
- INSERT TABLE 1 HERE - 
Table 1 shows that, according to our definitions, the firms of our sample are considerably 
more internationally integrated in the product than in the capital market. Almost two thirds of 
them are exposed to foreign competition in the former, either because they are exporters or 
because they face foreign competition in the domestic market, with slightly more than one 
third facing any foreign competition. Foreign capital, instead, accounts for only a minor role 
in firms’ capital structure: only four per cent of the 555 firms report foreign participation in 
their capital. 
The sample distribution of firms across the four categories (EFC, ENFC, NEFC and 
NENFC) is 23%, 15%, 27% and 35%, respectively. However, the distribution is quite 
heterogeneous across different sectors, revealing an interesting pattern In “Textiles” the 
shares appear very close to the sample average. By contrast, “Garments” and “Electrical 
White goods” represent opposite polar cases: about 60 percent of firms in the former are 
exporters, while 95% of those in Electronics are either N or IC firms. “Drugs & 
Pharmaceuticals” and “Electrical White Goods” are intermediate sectors with below-average 
shares of exporters and above-average shares of the other types. Finally, FO firms  are mostly 
concentrated in the “Textiles” and “Drugs & Pharmaceuticals” sectors, where they represent 
respectively 5 percent and 7.5 percent of firms. 
- INSERT TABLE 2 HERE – 
Table 2 cross-tabulates our classification against the geographical location. Urban areas 
appear specialized into different structure of productions. As expected, Delhi and Mumbai 
have the largest number of firms, but they differ somewhat in their specialization. About 45% 
of Delhi are not subject to foreign competition, while about one half of Mumbai firms are 
non-exporters facing foreign competition in the domestic market. About two thirds of the 
firms located in Chennai, Hyderabad and Cochin are exporters, partly facing foreign 
competition in the domestic market (EFC) and partly shielded from that (ENFC). Bangalore,   9
the preferred location for the software industry, is the most “globalized” city, with more than 
four fifth of its firms either in the E or the FC group, while the firms in Kanpur and Pune are 
mainly non-exposed to foreign competition. Finally, most FO firms are located in Delhi (7 
percent of the total), but it is in Bangalore, Cochin and Chandigarh where they represent the 
largest share of local firms (respectively 8 percent, 18 percent and 18 percent). No foreign 
owned firms on the sample are located in Ahmedabad and Kanpur. 
This pattern is consistent with the findings in Sachs, Bajpai and Ramiah (2002), who 
find that access to the sea is an important determinant of the export status of an Indian firm. 
The cities of Chennai, Hyderabad, Cochin, Bangalore - all located in Southern states - are 
close to the seas or have easy access to the sea. Delhi and Kanpur are instead in landlocked. 
Pune, in the region of Maharashstra, is rather far from the Ocean, and accordingly feature few 
exporters. Finally, Calcutta and Mumbai are on the Ocean, but cover so large metropolitan 
areas, that it is not surprising that they also host many non-global firms. 
 
Labor market variables 
 
Next we compare firms classes along their characteristics in the labor market. The 
questionnaire provides information on employment, hours worked and wages for five 
categories of workers (non-production workers, unskilled production workers, skilled 
production workers, professionals and managers). We aggregate the first three groups into 
“blue collars”, and the last two into “white collars”. Absolute and relative wage and 
employment data are only available for a subset of the 555 firms (respectively, 239 for wages 
and 509 for employment). 
- INSERT TABLE 3 HERE -  
The upper panel of Table 3 reports firm group averages for absolute and relative wages 
and employment levels as well as for unionization, training and promotion rates. The lower 
panel of Table 3 reports the p-values of pair-wise tests for equality-of-means between the 
different firm categories and the control groups of “protected” firms (NENFC) and 
domestically owned (DO). 
The average firm in our sample is quite large (191 workers) – a reflection of the sample’s 
under-representation of small and medium-sized enterprises. As expected, we find that firms 
not subject to foreign competition are on average much smaller and less unionized than other 
firms (differences in unionization rates and employment are highly significantly correlated, at 
the 1% level). By contrast, the composition of the labor force and the relative and absolute   10
wages of white and blue collars are quite similar across categories, with the only exception of 
foreign owned firms, which are larger and more unionized than domestically owned firms and 
pay lower white collar salaries – both in absolute and relative terms.  
In summary, globalization does not appear to be associated with significant differences 
in absolute or relative wages, but it seems associated with larger size and higher unionization 
rates. This finding is consistent with the evidence on Mexico and Morocco presented by 
Hanson and Harrison (1999). 
  Another interesting piece of evidence concerns the employees’ involvement in formal 
training programs (either in-house or external to the firm) in 1999. The seventh column of 
Table 3 shows that the proportion of employees involved in training programs is significantly 
higher in exportingfirms and firms subject to competition in the domestic market than for 
NENFC firms. Even more strikingly, as many as 77 percent of employees of  foreign owned 
firms are reported  involved in active training programs, while the percentage in  DO firms is 
only 19 percent. 
Finally, the last column of Table 3 shows the frequency of promotions, the average share 
of employees promoted in 1999, for our classification. Strikingly, an employee of an EFC 
firm is on average three times more likely to be promoted in 1999 than an employee of a 
NENFC firm. This implies the typical EFC firm employee, while earning a similar wage of a 
NENFC firm, enjoys in expected terms a noticeably higher lifetime income. Promotion rates 
are instead similar for non-exporting firms subject (NEFC) and not subject (NENFC) to 




Next we document that firms subject to foreign competition, abroad or domestically, face a 
higher volatility of labor and product market outcomes, both in terms of dispersion across 
firms and in terms of volatility over time. We measure the volatility in the labor and product 
market by the variance of wages, employment, prices, profits and sales. We construct the 
firms' output price variable as a geometric mean of the prices of the three main products sold 
by each firm in each year, using the products' shares in sales as weights. Net profits are 
defined as the before-tax operating surpluses net of interest charges, depreciation and other 
overhead expenses. 
In order to identify the volatility measure that is more likely to be affected by 
globalization, we employ a methodology suggested by Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994). The   11
variance of a variable (say, the wage rate) observed over time and for different firms can be 
decomposed into two separate elements: its cross-sectional dispersion at a point in time, and 
the (squared) deviation of the individual variable from its own average over time.
7 The former 
– labeled “permanent” volatility - is assumed to be determined by long-run phenomena The 
latter – called “transitory” volatility – is assumed to be caused bytemporary shocks Since we 
want to test whether international exposure is associated to higher uncertainty for workers and 
firms, we compute such decomposition and we focus on the short-run component of 
volatility.
8  
- INSERT TABLE 4 HERE -  
Table 4 shows the ratios of transitory variance over total variance for our variables in our four 
categories of firms. The transitory component is usually a rather small fraction of the overall 
variance, with a peak of 25 percent for net profits. The exporter status makes a big difference: 
exporters present transitory variance ratios which are systematically larger than firms not 
exposed to foreign competition. The difference is particularly pronounced and significant 
when “pure exporters” (ENFC) and “protected” firms (NENFC) are compared.
9 
 
Summing up on the sample characteristics 
 
Our descriptive statistics suggest that globalization is not associated to significant differences 
in absolute and relative wages, but it is associated to significant differences in volatility of 
labor and product market outcomes. This is the "bad news" of globalization for (risk-averse) 
firms and workers. At the same time the data suggest that globalization is associated to higher 
training opportunities. Exporters also present faster career tracks. These are the “good news” 
of globalization. In the next sections we test whether this evidence withstands the scrutiny of 
multivariate analysis. 
 
V.  ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
In this section we test whether these results continue to hold when we condition on other 
characteristics of the firms. The difficulty here is that the membership to our exposed/non-
                                                 
7 As shown by Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994), firm i′s wage rate at time t (wit) can  be decomposed into the sum 
of two components, with µi being the permanent, time invariant, component and vit the transitory component. 
Thus the variance of wit can then be written as the sum of the two variances σµ
2 and σv
2. 
8 Globalization brings about higher uncertainty. Yet the foreseeable, long-run component of uncertainty could be 
diversified away through the financial market. This is why we concentrate our attention on the short-run, 
presumably uninsurable, component of uncertainty. 
9 Lack of data does not allow the same calculation for foreign-owned and domestically owned firms.   12
exposed categories may not be random: firms may self-select depending on observable and 
unobservable characteristics (such as technological, managerial and organizational efficiency) 
that may be the ultimate explanation for their different labor market outcomes. 
In order to address this potential endogeneity bias we need to condition our estimates on 
an appropriate set of control variables. Although the cross-sectional nature of our data 
prevents us from using fully-fledged instrumental variables technique, we use proxies for 
managerial experience, skill and capital intensity, as well as sector and location dummies 
which should capture at least some of these unobservable components. 
We estimate regression models for the transitory variance of labor and product market 
outcomes, for the probability of having  training program and for the frequency of promotion 
and show the our main results are robust to the inclusion of a large set of controls. Next we 
present the results for volatility and then those for training and promotions. 
 
 (i) Volatility 
 
We investigate whether globalization is associated with higher volatility of labor and product 
market outcomes. The results from OLS regressions are presented in Table 5. 
- INSERT TABLE 5 HERE –  
We regress the logs of the transitory variances of prices, wages, employment, sales and net 
profits on dummies for the EFC, ENFC, and NEFC classes, (therefore the NENFC group is 
the control group), as well on a dummy for FO (so that the DO category is the control group).  
Each regression is run in three specifications, with an increasing number of controls. The 
reason is that the sample size dramatically shrinks with the number of regressors, see the last 
column of Table 5. 
In the first specification only the class dummies appear as regressors. The results are 
reported in the first row of each panel. In the second specification (see the second row), we 
add controls for firm's sector, location, and size (this is proxied by a unionization dummy).
10 
Finally, in the third specification (in row 3), we add proxies for firms’ productivity, such as 
entrepreneurial ability, capital intensity and average skill intensity. Entrepreneurial ability is 
measured by managerial experience (the years of experience the general manager had in the 
same sector before joining the firm). Capital intensity is measured as the ratio of the value of 
                                                 
10 We have also experimented with total employment as a proxy for size, with  identical results.   13
the installed capital stock and the number of employees. Skill intensity is measured by the 
ratio of non-production and production workers. 
This table shows a few interesting results. First, exporting firms, irrespective of whether 
they are subject to foreign competition in the domestic market (EFC) or not (ENFC), display a 
significantly higher transitory volatility than firms not subject to any foreign competition: this 
holds for prices, sales, employment and profits, although not for wages. In other words, 
exporters experience a significantly higher transitory variance of employment, product prices, 
sales and profits than a firm not exposed to foreign competition in any market. This effect is 
smaller for employment (in the interval of 6.4 and 10 per cent, based on point estimates), 
intermediate for product prices (between 10 and 44 per cent) and large for sales and profits 
(between 23.5 and 44 per cent).
11 
The results for the NEFC and FO dummy variables are less robust. In the baseline 
specification (row 1 of each panel), the coefficients of the NEFC and FO dummies are always 
positive and often strongly statistically significant. However, see row 2 and 3, the NEFC 
dummy loses significance for employment, profits and prices, once sector, location, 
unionization and productivity controls are included in the specification. The significance of 
the NEC dummy is still present for sales and wages. The foreign ownership dummy becomes 
stay significant only in the employment regressions when the additional controls are included. 
We interpret this evidence as suggesting that globalization is positively associated with 
product and labor market volatility, albeit not equally for all categories of firms. The 
association is robust for exporting firms, but not for NEFC firms. This may be due to the 
measurement error induced by the subjective nature of the firm classification relative to the 
presence foreign competitors in the domestic market.   Alternatively, the loss of statistical 
significance of the NEFC dummy’s coefficient when controlling for productivity controls 
may indicate that in our sample the endogeneity problem is especially relevant for the firms 




We test the hypothesis that firms facing foreign competition have stronger incentives to train  
their employees. We model the presence/absence of training as a discrete limited dependent 
variable, which is assumed to be distributed as a standard normal. The upper panel of Table 6 
                                                 
11 In our semi-log equations, the effect of a dummy variable on the dependent variable is given by exp(β)-1. E.g. 
in the reported examples: 6.4=exp(2)-1 and 44=exp(3.8)-1.   14
reports the estimates (the marginal effects) of probit analysis. The unobservable indicator is 
assumed to depend on the foreign exposure dummies as well as other controls. The first row 
of Table 6 presents the estimates for the globalization dummies without additional controls. 
Rows 2, 3 and 4 present the results obtained adding the controls for sector, unionization, 
location and productivity. Row 5 shows the results when the definition of exporters is 
changed by lowering the required shares of exports to sales to 10% (rather than 30%). 
- INSERT TABLE 6 HERE -  
The estimated coefficients of the globalization dummies are always positive and generally 
statistically significant, confirming that employees of firms exposed to foreign competition 
are more likely to be involved in training programs. Since the estimated coefficients in the 
relatively more parsimonious specifications (row 1, 2 and 3) may suffer from reverse 
causation or selection biases, the results in line 4 are our preferred ones, despite the smaller 
sample size. These estimates indicate that on average the probability for an EFC employee to 
be involved in a training program is about 30 percent higher than for a NENFC employee. We 
obtain similar results for the ENFC firms, although the estimated impact of “exporting only” 
on training is smaller and less precisely measured. The estimates for the FO dummy suggest 
that employees of FO firms are 40 percent more likely to receive training than employees of 
DO firms. . Our estimates for the NEFC dummy become insignificant when we introduce the 
productivity controls in the specification. This suggests that variables affecting the 
productivity of in NEFC firms are also important determinant of their propensity to train 
employees. Note that this does not seem to hold for exporting firms, no matter whether or not 
they face foreign competitors in the domestic market.  
Overall, we interpret our findings as evidence that, the employees of exporting firms – 
irrespective whether they are subject to foreign competition or not - are more likely to be 
engaged in training programs. The same applies to workers employed in FO firms. Row 5 




Next we test the conjecture that employees of globalized firms have faster careers. We look at 
promotion rates, defined as the share of the firm's workforce that received a promotion in 
1999. This is a continuous variable ranging between zero and one. We model the promotion 
rate as a function of foreign competition and of the other control variables. Unfortunately, the   15
data on promotions are only available for about 340 (out of 555) firms, which considerably 
reduces the sample size.  
The OLS estimates are shown in the lower panel of Table 6. Here we present the results 
for promotions along five rows – rows 6 to 10 – whose specifications exactly match the 
specifications in the corresponding rows in the upper panel of the table. Hence, row 6 shows 
results corresponding to the most parsimonious empirical specification and row 9-10 
corresponding to the least parsimonious ones. As with the training estimations, the fit of the 
regression improves considerably when we include the location dummies. The main result 
from this set of regressions is that the promotion rate is about two percent higher for the 
average EFC employee than for the employee of the other types of firms. The statistical 
significance of the exporting dummy varies, however, seem to vary when we change the set 
of regressors and when the exports’ threshold is lowered (see  row 10 ). 
There do not seem to be robust differences in promotion rates between other firm 
categories, and the (excluded) NENFC firms, as well as no differences between FO and DO 
firms. 
Overall, the promotion results are less statistically significant than those pertaining to 
training of the workforce. Yet we are inclined to interpret them as (weaker) evidence that the 
employees of EFC firms are more frequently promoted than employees of other firms. 
 
(iv) The link between globalization and uncertainty  
 
Our results suggest that globalization, by raising volatility of product and labor markets (the 
“bad side” of globalization), enhances the incentives for training and speeds up careers, 
particularly for exporting firms (the “good side” of globalization). However, this 
interpretation is, strictly speaking, not warranted. Our results show that: (a) there exist a 
positive correlation between globalization and volatility and (b) there is a positive correlation 
between globalization, training and, promotions. Yet these correlations may not necessarily be 
due to the more volatile environment. For example, that correlation may be due to the fact that 
firms exposed to international competition need to innovate faster and invest more in human 
capital to stay in business.  
In order to shed light on this issue, we adopt the following two-stage procedure. First, 
we decompose the volatility of product and labor market variables into foreign and domestic 
components. This is accomplished by regressing the transitory variance of each variable on 
the foreign competition dummies. The predicted value of such regression identifies the   16
foreign component of volatility. We label the residual the "domestic" component. Second, we 
include the foreign component and the domestic component separately as explanatory 
variables in the training and promotions regressions. If globalization is directly associated to 
uncertainty, the coefficient of the foreign component should be “large” and significant. 
- INSERT TABLE 7 HERE - 
Table 7 shows that the volatility originating from foreign competition is indeed positively 
associated with the likelihood that firms/workers are involved in training. Looking at the 
training regressions we find that the estimated coefficients of foreign volatility (of prices, 
wages, employments, sales and profits) are all positive and highly significant (see columns 1 
to 5). Moreover, the coefficients of the foreign components are typically much larger than the 
coefficients of the corresponding domestic component. 
Columns 6 to 10 show the results for promotions. The foreign volatility of sales, prices 
and net profits are positively associated with promotions. Here, however, the estimated 
coefficients are all smaller in size. 
These tests support our priors that a direct link between globalization, uncertainty and 
labor market outcomes is at work, particularly with respect to training opportunities. The fact 
that the results for promotions are less clear cut may imply that the direct and indirect effects 
of foreign competition on faster careers are more difficult to disentangle, and/or possibly 
more subject to endogeneity bias. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper provides evidence that globalization produces “twin effects”. In our sample of 
Indian manufacturing firms, exporting, foreign-owned and, less robustly, firms subject to 
foreign competition in the domestic market “suffer” from higher volatility of employment, 
sales, profits and prices. At the same time, however, the employees of exporting and foreign-
owned firms are more frequently involved in training programs. Furthermore, the employees 
of exporting firms are more likely to be promoted. Our data support the conjecture of a "direct 
link" from globalization to volatility and from volatility to training. The direct link with 
promotion rates is instead less precisely estimated. 
Our results are robust to the inclusion of various control variables, including a set of 
plausible determinants of firm productivity such as entrepreneurial experience, skill intensity 
and the capital-labor ratio, and they also hold for different – parametric and non-parametric – 
estimation techniques (the latter are available from the authors upon request). The results   17
obtained for foreign competition in the domestic market are more fragile, though, and only 
hold for a handful of empirical specifications. 
Altogether, our analysis shows that firms exposed to globalization do not passively 
suffer from the new, riskier environment; they react by upgrading the skills of their labor 
force and, to a lesser extent, by offering faster careers to their employees. These results 
provide a micro-econometric foundation for the positive correlation between trade 
liberalization and growth often found in aggregate studies (see Dollar and Kraay, 2004), and, 
similarly, a new rationale for the positive correlation between exports and productivity growth 
at the firm level (see Bernard and Jensen, 1999). 
A note of caution is required at this point. These conclusions apply to our sample of 
Indian firms, and whether they hold “in general” we cannot say. Moreover, these findings 
concern firms that survive in the globalized economy. What happens to the employees of the 
firms who do not, we cannot tell. Thus, from the policy side, the positive effects of 
globalization do not necessarily undermine the case for safety nets: these should be 
implemented in parallel to trade liberalization. There still is a case for promoting 
unemployment insurance schemes: but these schemes should be conditional upon workers’ 
willingness to engage in training programs.   18
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Table 1:  
Firm breakdown by exposure to foreign competition and sector 
Number of Firms Operating in Each Sector 
 
 











All Sample   
 
178 159 142  44  32  555 
EFC  61 39 22  2  3 127 
ENFC  41 24 14  0  3  82 
NEFC  
 
28 36 49 20 17  150 
 
NENFC              48 60 57 22  9 196 
FO (Foreign 
Owned)                 3 13  18 2  2 38 
DO (Domestically 
Owned)    
240 232 220  62  71  825 
 
Notes: EFC (Exporters and exposed to foreign competition in the domestic market) are firms with (total exports) / 
(total sales) > 30% and declaring to have foreign competitors in the domestic market. ENFC (Exporters and not 
exposed to foreign competition in the domestic market) are firms with (total exports) / (total sales) > 30% and 
declaring not to have foreign competitors in the domestic market. NEFC (Non exporters and exposed to foreign 
competition) are firms with (total exports) / (total sales) <30% and declaring to have foreign competitors in the 
domestic market. NENFC are the residual category of firms not exporting and not subject to foreign competitors in 
the domestic market. Foreign Owned (FO) is any firm with some foreign capital ownership. Domestic Owned 
(DO) firms are those not included in the group of FO. 
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Table 2:  
Firm breakdown by exposure to foreign competition and location 
 
Number of Firms Operating in Each Locality (States in parentheses) 
 
Location   All sample  EFC  ENFC  NEFC  NENFC 
Mumbai (Maharashrtra)        127  18  14  60  35 
Delhi (Haryana)        141  28  14  36  63 
Chennai  (Tamil Nadu)  109  39  32  11  27 
Ahmedabad (Gujarat)  22  5  2  5  10 
Calcutta (West Bengal)  29  4  1  8  16 
Bangalore (Karnataka)   34  8  5  15  6 
Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh)  36  11  10  6  9 
Kanpur  (Uttar Pradesh)            26  4  0  2  20 
Chandigarh (Punjab)  13  5  1  4  3 
Pune (Maharashtra)  8  1  0  2  5 
Cochin (Kerala)  10  4  3  1  2 
All localities  555  127  82  150  196 
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Table 3:  
Labor market variables 
 





* indicate that the means calculated for the two groups of firms are significantly different, at a 5% and a 10% 
confidence level. WW = average hourly wages of White Collars (W); WB = average hourly wages of Blue Collars (B) in 
thousand rupees. Blue Collars (LB) = Unskilled Production Workers + Skilled Production and Non-Production Workers; 
White Collars (LW) = Managers + Professionals. “Unionization” indicates the average percentage of unionized workers for 
each firm category. The means reported above are computed by trimming right-end tails so as to leave out 2% of the 
cumulative distribution of each variable. By following this method, the following observations have been left out of the 
sample: WB>7, WW >20, L>5000. “Training” is the percentage of firms that takes advantage of (in-house or external) 
training programs. “Promotions” measures the percentage of workers that moved to higher working positions during 1999. 
The number of non-missing observations for each firm group is shown in parentheses. The number of non-missing 
observations for each firm group is shown in parentheses. 
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P-values for Mean 
Equality Test: 
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Table 4:  
The transitory variance of wages, employment, prices, sales and net profits 
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P-values for  Mean 
Equality Test: 
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Equality Test: 
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Notes: The figures in Table 4 refer to average values.  2
v σ  is the temporary component of the total variance  2 σ .  “Prices” 
refers to the average prices for the period 1998-99.  “Wages” refers to the average nominal wage paid in the period 1997-
99. “Sales” refers to the average sales for the period 1997-99. “Profits” refers to the average net profits for the period 
1997-99. Data computed after 2% trimming of right-end tails. The numbers in brackets are the observations employed to 
compute the variable means. The asterisks 
** and 
* indicate that the means of the transitory variable calculated for the two 
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Table 5:  














































































































































































































(1.21)  Yes Yes  268 
Notes: The dependent variable, for each of the five equations, is the transitory component of the variances (σ
2
v) of, 
respectively, prices, nominal wages, employment, sales, net profits. EFC, ENFC are NEFC are dummies for the firm’s 
foreign exposure status (E=exporter; FC=Foreign competitors). Benchmark in each regression: non-exporter firms that are 
not subject to foreign competition in the domestic market (NENFC). The controls mentioned in Column 5 are unionization, 
sector and locality dummies, defined in the main text. The “Productivity controls” in Column 6 include the logged capital-
labor ratio, entrepreneurial experience and the share of skilled production workers. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, 
**,*** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level of significance, respectively. 
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Table 6:  
The determinants of training and promotions 
 



































(.098)  No No  No  No  .056  528 











(.123)  Yes Yes No  No .171  522 











(.134)  Yes Yes  Yes  No .240  522 










(.161)  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes .317  293 
Training 










(.160)  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes .323  293 









(.020)  No No  No  No  .022  344 








(.021)  Yes Yes No  No .023  342 








(.020)  Yes Yes  Yes  No .102  342 








(.022)  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes .171  218 
Promotion 
opportunities 







(.023)  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes .169  218 
 
Notes: “Training” is a dummy variable taking value one if the firm is involved in either in-house or external training programs, and zero otherwise.  “Promotion opportunities” measure the 
number of workers promoted in 1999 divided by total employees in 1999. The benchmark in each regression is the non-exporter firm that is not subject to foreign competition in the 
domestic market (NENFC). The reported coefficients in rows 1 to 5 are the marginal coefficients obtained from STATA ‘dprobit’ procedure. In rows 5 and 10 the exporter category takes 
values equal to one for the firms selling more than 10% of their sales abroad and zero otherwise. In all other rows, the threshold for being exporters is 30% of total sales being sold abroad. 
Pseudo-R
2 values reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*, 
**,
*** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level of significance, respectively 26 
 
Table 7:  
Direct tests of the link between globalization and labor market outcomes 
 
Dependent variable 
 Training  Promotions 
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
prices v for , ˆ σ   .079
*** 
(.005)  - - - -  .0069
** 
(.0035)  - - - - 
prices v dom , ˆ σ   .005
* 
(.003)  - - - -  .0004 
(.0059)  - - - - 
wages v for , ˆ σ   -  .249
*** 
(.056)  - - - -  .0098 
(.0099)  - - - 
wages v dom , ˆ σ   -  .004 
(.008)  - - - -  -.0016 
(.0013)  - - - 
nt empl v for ' , ˆ σ   - -  .145
*** 
(.032)  - - - -  .0066 
(.0061)  - - 
nt empl v dom ' , ˆ σ   - -  .048
*** 
(.010)  - - - -  .0023 
(.0018)  - - 
sales v for , ˆ σ   - - -  .068
*** 
(.013)  - - - -  .0044
* 
(.0023)  - 
sales v dom , ˆ σ   - - -  .027
*** 
(.005)  - - - -  .0009 
(.0008)  - 
profits v for , ˆ σ   - - - -  .074
*** 
(.014)  - - - -  .0041
* 
(.0023) 
profits v dom , ˆ σ   - - - -  .026
*** 
(.005)  - - - -  .0003 
(.0008) 
Control  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
#  Observations  450 335 308 518 472 290 235 206 341 313 
R
2 .19  .22  .28  .24 .27 .10 .13 .10 .10 .11 
Notes: Control dummies include sector, location and unionization dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 *, 
**,






A model of globalization, uncertainty and the firm 
 
Here we develop a simple model that describes the effects of uncertainty on firms' behavior. 
In this model, globalization raises the volatility of wages and productivity. Due to limited 
access to the insurance and credit market, risk-averse firms' size expands as firms try to 
reduce the costs of uncertainty on profits. Clearly, uncertainty may also reduce the incentives 
for firm specific training and promotions, for example by raising the probability of 
bankruptcy and lay-offs. Our model here is simply meant to illustrate a framework consistent 
with the facts at hand. 
In a two-sector economy, the perfectly competitive (informal) sector, say agriculture, 
employs unskilled labor, and the manufacturing sector employs both skilled and unskilled 
labor. The supply of unskilled labor is perfectly elastic and there is perfect mobility across 
sectors, so that the real wage rate for unskilled labor is fixed at w, the marginal value of 
leisure time. Unlike workers employed in agriculture, those employed in manufacturing have 
the option to become skilled. This requires costly training and leads, with some probability, to 
higher productivity and wage (w + ∆). Given the worker's optimal supply of effort, the firm 
chooses how many workers to employ and the optimal incentive premium ∆.  
In this framework, there are two sources of uncertainty. The firm faces uncertainty in 
profits, due to productivity shocks, ε. The firm chooses an incentive scheme ∆ and the number 
of workers to employ L, then a productivity shock occurs, ε ∼(0,σε²).  
The representative firm chooses how many workers to employ and the optimal incentive 
∆, taking workers' behavior T(∆;σv²) into account. The productivity of each worker is 
stochastic and given by (e+ε). Here the idea is that exposure to international competition 
presents opportunities and risks for firms: technological innovation may be easily adopted, 
fostering productivity, or may make the existing technologies obsolete, reducing productivity. 
Let L represent the number of workers, so that employment in efficiency units is L(e+ε). 
Output is produced according to the production function F[L(e+ε]), F′>0, F′′<0. Recalling 
that a fraction e of employees is paid (w + ∆) and a fraction (1 - e) is paid w, the firms 
expected profits are: 
π = Eε{F[L(e+ε)] – L[e(w + ∆) + (1 – e)w]}  
= Eε{F[L(e + ε)] – L(w + e∆)} 28 
 
  In what follows we assume for simplicity that F(x) = x
a, 0< a <1. Before the realization 
of the productivity shock, the firm chooses an incentive scheme ∆ and employment L to 
maximize expected profits. As above, these can be proxied by: 
π ≅ F(eL) – [w + e∆]L + (σε²/2)F′′(eL) 
= F(l) – [(w/e) + ∆]l + (σε²/2)F′′(l) 
where l =eL is labor in average efficiency units. The more concave is the production function, 
the more the firm dislikes uncertainty. The first order condition for l yields: F′(l) + 
(σε²/2)F′′′(l) = (w/e) + ∆. This expression equates the (risk corrected) marginal product of 
labor (in average efficiency units) to the average wage premium (always expressed in 
efficiency units). From this expression one can derive a labor demand function: l = l(w,∆;σε²). 
  It is easy to show that the volatility of productivity σε² raises the demand for labor as 
long as the output elasticity a is less than one. Intuitively, the firm cares less about volatility 
the higher its revenue, so that it reacts to more uncertainty by expanding its size as measured 
by employment. Finally, the first order condition for the optimal incentive ∆ yields: η(∆) = 
(∆T(∆;σv²)/w), where η(∆) = ∆T′(.)/T is the elasticity of the effort function with respect to the 
wage premium. As in the standard efficiency wage model, the equality between this elasticity 
and the wage premium completely determines ∆. Then, the training supply schedule T(∆;σv²) 
determines the optimal effort in training, while employment is determined by l through the 
identity L=l/e. 
Simple comparative static shows that: (a) a rise in real wage volatility σv² raises training 
effort (e) (b) a rise in the volatility of productivity (σε²) raises employment without affecting 
training and the wage premium (if the output elasticity a<1). 
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